Using a panel fixed effects model for a sample of 121 countries covering 1975-2005, we examine how financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises are related to income inequality. In contrast with most previous work, our results suggest that all finance variables increase income inequality. The level of financial development conditions the impact of financial liberalization on inequality. Also the quality of political institutions conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality, in contrast to the quality of economic institutions. Our main findings are robust for using random effects, cross-country regressions and legal origin as instrument for financial development.
Introduction
We examine the relationship between finance and income inequality using panel fixed effects regressions for a large sample of countries. To be more precise, we analyze how financial development, financial liberalization and financial crises are related to within country income inequality. As dependent variable we use five-year averages of Gini coefficients based on households' gross income from Solt's (2009) There is an extensive literature on the relationship between financial development and income inequality. 1 Theoretically, the impact of financial development is ambiguous. On the one hand, more finance may make it easier for poor individuals to borrow for viable projects, which may reduce income inequality (Galor and Moav, 2004) . Financial imperfections, such as information and transaction costs, may be especially binding on the poor who lack collateral and credit histories so that relaxation of these credit constraints may benefit the poor (Beck et al., 2007) . On the other hand, improvements in the formal financial sector could be more likely to benefit the well-off who rely less on informal connections for capital (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990 ). As will be discussed in more detail in section 2, the empirical evidence on the relationship between financial development and income inequality is very mixed. Instead of providing yet another set of regressions that possibly adds to this diversity, we examine whether institutional quality conditions the relationship between financial development and income inequality, which may shed some light on the reasons why studies reach different conclusions. According to Rajan and Zingales (2003) , in weak institutional environments established interests have privileged access to finance so that financial development induced by captured direct controls is likely to hurt the poor. In the presence of strong institutions, financial development may reduce inequality, allowing the poor to invest in human and physical capital (Law et al., 2014) . A similar argument can be made for financial liberalization (Delis et al., 2014) . 2 
3
In recent decades there has been a global push to liberalize the financial sector. A small, but growing line of literature examines the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality. For instance, Beck et al. (2010) assess the impact of U.S. bank deregulation of the 1970s to the 1990s on the distribution of income and find that deregulation significantly reduces inequality by boosting incomes in the lower part of the income distribution but has little impact on incomes above the median. Likewise, some recent studies Delis et al., 2014; Li and Yu, 2014) based on crosscountry data report that financial liberalization reduces income inequality, but Jaumotte and Osuorio Buitron (2015) and Naceur and Zhang (2016) conclude that financial liberalization increases inequality (see section 2 for more details). Bumann and Lensink (2016) suggest that the impact of financial liberalization on inequality is conditioned by financial development. In their view, "financial liberalization will improve income distribution in countries where financial depth is high. The main reason for our finding is that in countries with high financial depth, the interest rate elasticity of loan demand is high. A financial liberalization policy that improves bank efficiency and reduces borrowing costs will lead to a sharp increase in aggregate loan demand, requiring an increase in the deposit rate to restore equilibrium in the financial market. The increase in the deposit rate improves the income of savers and, hence, income distribution" (p. 144). 3 We will examine whether financial development conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality.
A third financial variable that we consider are financial crises. Conventional wisdom is that the poor suffer disproportionately from recessions following financial crises.
However, Denk and Cournede (2015) do not find a significant effect of banking crisis in their analysis of income inequality in OECD countries. Only few studies (e.g. Baldacci et al., 2002; Yu, 2015) analyze the causal relationship between financial crises and income inequality for a broader set of countries and report mixed findings.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we include financial development, financial liberalization and financial crises in our empirical analysis of the relationship between finance and income inequality. Previous studies include at best two of 4 these variables at the same time. Second, we use different indicators of financial liberalization. Like previous studies we use the financial liberalization data of Abiad et al. (2010) , but also construct an alternative indicator based on some components of the economic freedom index of the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al., 2015) . This enables us to check how sensitive results are for the way financial liberalization is measured. Third, we examine whether the impact of finance on income inequality is conditioned by: (1) the level of financial development as suggested by Bumann and Lensink (2016) ; and (2) institutional quality as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (2003) .
Our results suggest that a higher level of financial development, financial liberalization and the occurrence of a banking crisis all increase income inequality in a country. In contrast to the prediction by Bumann and Lensink (2016) , our results suggest that with high levels of financial development, financial liberalization increases income inequality. We also find evidence that, unlike the quality of economic institutions, the quality of political institutions conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality: with higher levels of democratic accountability the positive effect of financial liberalization on inequality increases. Institutional quality does not condition the impact of financial development on income inequality, in contrast to the prediction by Rajan and Zingales (2003) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related studies in more detail. Section 3 describes our methodology and data used, while section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 offers a sensitivity analysis and section 6 concludes.
Literature review
As pointed out by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) , theory provides ambiguous predictions for the impact of finance on income distribution. A distinction can be made between the effects of finance on the extensive and the intensive margin. The extensive margin is about the use of financial services by individuals who had not been using those services. For example, financial development may help poor families to borrow to pay for education. Inequality falls in models with this mechanism (Galor and Moav, 2004) . 4 The 5 effect of financial development on income inequality on the intensive margin is different.
Improvements in the quality and range of financial services do not tend to broaden access to financial services, but instead improve the quality of financial services enjoyed by those already purchasing financial services (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) . The benefits of these intensive margin effects accrue primarily to the rich, widening the distribution of income.
The extensive empirical literature on the relationship between financial development and income inequality provides very mixed findings. 5 Although several studies report that countries with higher levels of financial development have less income inequality (see e.g. Li et al. 1998 , Clarke et al., 2006 , Beck et al., 2007 , Kappel, 2010 , Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012 and Naceur and Zhang, 2016 , 6 other studies report a non-linear relationship (e.g. Kim and Lin, 2011 and Law et al., 2014) , 7 mixed results (Bahmani-Oskooee and Zhang, 2015), 8 or a than size should be examined. Most empirical research focuses, however, on financial sector size, a recent exception being the study by Naceur and Zhang (2016) . 5 Here we only discuss research using macro data for a large set of countries. For a discussion of other types of research we refer to Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009). 6 Li et al. (1998) use data for 49 countries over the 1947-94 period and report a strong relationship between income inequality and their measure for financial development (M2/GDP). Beck et al. (2007) report a negative relationship between financial development (proxied by private credit-to-GDP) and the growth rate of the Gini coefficient, which holds when controlling for real per capita GDP growth, lagged values of the Gini coefficient, and a wide array of other country-specific factors. Their sample consists of 65 countries over the period . Using a similar model for a larger group of countries (83) but a shorter sample period , Clarke et al. (2006) also find that financial development reduces inequality. Kappel (2010) , who uses a sample of 59 countries for a cross-country analysis and 78 countries for a panel analysis over the period 1960 to 2006, concludes that financial development reduces income inequality for high-income countries, but is not significant for low-income countries. Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012) use annual panel data for a sample of 126 countries over the 1963-2002 period and find that both M2/GDP and private credit-to-GDP reduce estimated household income inequality when they use panel fixed effects and GMM. Naceur and Zhang (2016) use a sample of 143 countries from 1961 to 2011 and find that several dimensions of financial development considered (access, efficiency, deepening and stability) can significantly reduce income inequality and poverty, while financial liberalization tends to exacerbate them. 7 Based on a sample of 65 countries for 1960 -2005 , Kim and Lin (2011 find that the benefits of financial development on income distribution occur only when the country has reached a threshold level of financial development. Below this critical threshold, financial development exacerbates income inequality. Using data for 81 countries over the period 1985-2010 in a cross-section model, Law et al. (2014) conclude that financial development tends to reduce income inequality only after a certain threshold level of institutional quality has been achieved. Until then, the effect of financial development on income inequality is nonexistent. In the panel regressions for the Gini coefficient in a sample of 18 Asian countries over the 1996-2005 reported by Li and Yu (2015) the coefficient of credit-to-GDP is positive and significant. Likewise, Denk and Cournède (2015) conclude that more finance is associated with higher income inequality in their sample of 33 OECD countries. This relationship holds when intermediated credit and stock market capitalization are used to measure the size of finance. Financial sector employees are very strongly concentrated at the top of the income distribution, and their earnings exceed those of employees with similar profiles (such as age, gender or education) in other sectors (Denk, 2015) .
Whereas most studies discussed do not explore the transmission from finance to inequality, Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011) examine specific channels linking banks, capital markets and income inequality. They construct a set of annual indicators of banking and capital market size, robustness, efficiency and international integration and then estimate the determinants of income distribution using a panel structural vector autoregressive model for 49 countries over the 1994-2002 period. 9 These authors conclude that financial sector development increases income inequality and that this impact seems to run primarily via the banking sector; Naceur and Zhang (2016) reach the same conclusion.
Finally, some studies suggest that the impact of financial development on income inequality may be conditioned by the quality of institutions (cf. Delis et al., 2014 and Law et distribution the improvement lasts in the long run. 7 al., 2014). For instance, under low quality of economic institutions financial development (or financial liberalization) may not affect inequality due to lack of judicial protection for the poor (Chong and Gradstein 2007) . Likewise, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that under weak political institutions de jure political representation is dominated by de facto political influence allowing established interests to influence access to finance so that they benefit more from financial development than the poor.
Several arguments have been put forward in the literature suggesting that financial sector liberalization may affect income distribution. First, imperfections in the credit market prevent the poor from making productive investment, in for instance, education (Banerjee and Newman, 1991) . If financial liberalization reduces these credit market imperfections, income inequality may be reduced. Second, financial reforms may lead to more equal access to credit thereby improving the efficiency of the domestic financial system (Abiad et al., 2008) .
A few studies examine the relationship between financial sector liberalization and income inequality using cross-country data (most of these studies use the database of Abiad Likewise, Delis et al. (2014) conclude that higher liberalization of banking generally leads to narrower income distribution. Yet, they also find that this effect is not uniform across all liberalization policies, nor is it the same across countries with different levels of development or different types of financial environments. In particular, the abolishment of credit controls decreases income inequality substantially, and this effect is long lasting. Li and Yu (2014) report for 18 countries in Asia for the 1996-2005 period that financial reform is effective in reducing income inequality, but that the effect is more profound in a country with higher human capital. Jaumotte and Osuorio Buitron (2015) investigate income inequality in 20 advanced economies during 1980-2010 with a focus on labor 8 market institutions and include the index of Abiad et al. (2010) as control variable. They find that its coefficient is significantly positive. 10 Also Naceur and Zhang (2016) report that financial liberalization increases inequality. Christopoulos and McAdam (2015) examine the link between financial reforms and the stabilization of income inequality using panel unit root tests extended to allow for the presence of some covariates. Their results suggest that although both gross and net Gini indices follow a unit root process this picture changes when the various financial reforms indices are considered as additional covariates in the standard panel unit root approach. In particular whilst gross Gini coefficients are generally not stabilized by financial reforms, net measures are more likely to be stabilized. Bumann and Lensink (2016) argue that the impact of financial liberalization on inequality is conditioned by financial development. Their theoretical model suggests that financial liberalization will improve income distribution in countries where financial depth is high. The authors' empirical results suggest that their measure of financial liberalization, i.e. capital account liberalization, only tends to lower income inequality if the level of financial depth, as measured by private credit over GDP, exceeds 25 percent. These results stand in contrast to the findings of Furceri and Loungani (2015) . Based on panel data for 149 countries from 1970 to 2010, these authors conclude that, on average, capital account liberalization increases inequality. In addition, their results suggest that capital account liberalization leads to larger increases in inequality in countries with a weak level of financial institutions and when they are followed by episodes of financial crises.
Finally, we consider the impact of financial crises on income inequality. Wealth losses due to a financial crisis probably will hit the top of the income distribution. However, lowincome individuals will be hit more if the financial crisis is followed by an economic downturn (which is not always the case). Indeed, according to the OECD (2013) (2015) include a banking crisis dummy and find that it has a positive relationship with the Gini coefficient (crises lead to more inequality). Also Atkinson and Morelli (2011) find that income inequality is likely to increase after a banking crisis. In contrast, , who use annual data for 62 OECD and non-OECD countries for the 1980-2006 period find mixed results. While for OECD countries a banking crisis reduces inequality, for non-OECD the authors observe a significant rise in inequality before the onset of the crisis but no effect thereafter. In contrast, for a sample of developing countries, Honohan (2005) does not find evidence for a significant difference between Gini coefficients before and after a banking crisis. Likewise, Jaumotte and Osuorio Buitron (2015) do not report a significant impact of banking crises on income inequality.
While there is limited research on a causal relationship between financial crisis and inequality, the causality in the other direction, i.e. from (increases in) income inequality to financial crises, has received substantial attention. High or rising income inequality may cause low-income groups to leverage in order to increase or maintain consumption levels which, in turn, may increase the likelihood of a financial crisis. The relative income theory, habit formations and a ''keeping up with the Joneses'' phenomenon may explain such behavior (see Atkinson and Morelli, 2011 for a further discussion). For instance, in the model of Kumhof and Rancière (2011) rising income inequality and stagnant incomes in the lower deciles lead workers to borrow to maintain consumption growth. This increases leverage, and eventually a shock to the economy leads to a financial crisis. Indeed, there is much evidence that financial crises are often preceded by credit booms (Schularick and Taylor, 2012) .
However, the empirical evidence in support of causality running from inequality to financial crises is weak at best. Cross-country data indicate that banking crises have not systematically been preceded by rising inequality (Atkinson and Morelli, 2011; Bordo and Meissner, 2012) , although Gu and Huang (2014) report some supporting evidence. 11
Data and method

Income inequality
Our left-hand side variable is the Gini coefficient based on households' income from Solt's (2009) Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). We use the index that represents household income before taxes, as this shows inequality exclusive of fiscal policy. 12 As pointed out by Delis et al. (2014) and Solt (2015) , the SWIID database is the most comprehensive database and allows comparison across countries, because it standardizes income. 13 The Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve and ranges between 0 (perfect equality) and 100 (perfect inequality). We acknowledge that the Gini coefficient is less than perfect and that other measures, such as the share of income of the lowest quintile, may sometimes be more appropriate. Data availability, however, dictates our choice. We construct averages of the Gini coefficients across 5 years where the Gini coefficients are centered at the middle of the five-year period.
We use five-year non-overlapping averages for three reasons (see also Dabla-Norris et al., 2015) . First, annual macroeconomic data are noisy, and this applies especially for data on income inequality (Delis et al., 2014) . Second, the annual income inequality data in SWIID are imputed for years for which no information was available in the underlying databases (there are only infrequent measures of inequality for much of Africa, Latin America, and Asia). Third, some of the explanatory variables used are only available for five-11 year intervals. Fourth, we are not so much interested in short-term, i.e. business cycle, driven effects.
We have considered using the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) instead of SWIID as source for data on income inequality. SWIID is based on WIID, but is supplemented by other sources and has all of its observations multiply-imputed (Jenkins, 2015) . 14 WIID often provides more than one Gini coefficient for the same country/year. To deal with this problem, we proceed as follows. We first take averages of country/year pairs that have the same quality label (high, average, low, not known). This reduces the number of potential duplicates to at most 4 (high, average, low, not known) per country/year pair.
Next, we take the average Gini coefficient that belongs to the highest quality group so that we have one observation per country/year, which can be an average of several observations of the highest quality available. As we are not interested in short-run dynamics, our analysis is based on 5-year averages. As SWIID provides observations for each year, these averages can be easily computed. In WIID there are many missing observations. We considered two alternative approaches to construct proxies for the Gini coefficient measured over 5-year intervals. First, we take the Gini coefficients in the middle of this 5-year period, if available (Gini (WIID)). The downside of this approach is that we are not averaging out of a couple of adjacent years. As an alternative, we take a 5-years average (Gini 5 years avg (WIID)); this results in a non available in case at least one of these years is not available, thereby reducing the sample substantially.
[ Table 1 here] Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the gross and net Gini coefficients drawn from SWIID and the Gini coefficients constructed on the basis of WIID. As the table shows, the number of observations available for the income inequality measures based on WIID is much lower than for those based on SWID. When using data from WIID we cannot distinguish between market and net Gini coefficients. As pointed out by Solt (2015, p. 685) this is problematic: "mixing gross-and disposable-income observations … suggests a simple failure to consider what is the theoretically relevant variable…" However, such a distinction 12 would reduce the sample even further. It appears that about a quarter of the observations in WIID follow some kind of gross income concept.
The correlations reported in Table 1 support this and suggest that most of the WIID data are indeed based on a net income concept: the correlation of the WIID variables with our (preferred) gross Gini coefficient from SWIID is relatively low (0.6 or 0.5), whereas it is much higher with the net Gini coefficients from SWIID (around 0.9).
As we are interested in the impact of finance on income inequality before income redistribution and do want to be able to work with a respectable and representative sample, we decided against using the WIID data.
Explanatory variables
We measure financial development by private credit divided by GDP. This measure excludes credit to the central bank, development banks, the public sector, credit to state-owned enterprises, and cross claims of one group of intermediaries on another. Thus, it captures the amount of credit channeled from savers, through financial intermediaries, to private firms. It has advantages over alternative measures of financial development, such as M2 over GDP, which does not measure a key function of financial intermediaries, which is the channeling of society's savings to private sector projects (Beck et al., 2007) . In addition, the evidence of Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011) and Naceur and Zhang (2016) suggests that the impact of finance on income inequality runs via the banking sector rather than capital market capitalization. 15 Figure 1 shows two scatter plots of our measures for income inequality and financial development. The graph on the left-hand side shows the relationship using the raw data.
This graph does not suggest that there is a relationship between the two variables. The graph on the right-hand side shows the relationship controlling for country-fixed effects.
This graph suggests that more financial development increases income inequality.
[ Figure 1 here]
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We use two measures for financial sector liberalization. First, following previous studies we employ the data of Abiad et al. (2010) that is based on several sub-indices mostly pertaining to banking regulatory practices measured on a scale from 0 to 3 (fully repressed to fully liberalized). The database covers 91 economies over the period and consists of seven indices of financial sector liberalization. Our first measure of financial liberalization is the sum of six sub-indices. As the sub-index on banking supervision is not about financial sector liberalization we exclude it. Our sample for which we use this proxy for financial liberalization consists of 89 countries (listed in Table A1 As an alternative, we employ data from the Fraser Institute on economic freedom that has a broader coverage of the financial sector (as pointed out by Delis et al. (2014) , the index of Abiad et al. (2010) primarily reflects policies related to the banking sector) 16 and is available for more countries and more recent years. The economic freedom index covers up to 157 countries with data relevant for this paper being available for approximately 70 countries as far back as 1975. 17 We use the sum of four sub-indices from the economic freedom database, namely the sub-indices 3D, 4C, 4D and 5A. These indices range between 0 (not free) to 10 (totally free). The first index refers to freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts and measures the ease with which other currencies can be used via domestic and foreign bank accounts. The second index is based on the percentage difference between the official and the parallel (black) market exchange rate. Countries with a domestic currency that is fully convertible without restrictions receive a score of ten. When exchange rate controls are present and a black market exists, the ratings will decline toward zero as the black-market premium increases toward more than 50%. In the latter case, a zero rating is given. The third index measures controls of the movement of capital. The fourth index measures the extent to which the banking industry is privately owned, the extent to which credit is supplied to the government sector and whether controls on interest rates interfere with the market in credit. Our sample for which we use this proxy for financial liberalization 16 The sub-indices of the index of Abiad et al. (2010) refer to credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, banking-sector entry, capital-account transactions, privatizations of banks, liberalization of securities markets, and banking-sector supervision and capital regulation. Our crisis data come from Laeven and Valencia (2013) who provide information on the timing of systemic banking crises. Chaudron and de Haan (2014) show that this database is more reliable than competing financial crises databases. Crises are identified based on several criteria. First, there should be signs of financial distress in the banking system. Banking crises are also identified by "significant banking policy intervention measures" of which they identify six (such as a deposit freeze or nationalizations). At least three of these measures need to have been implemented for a crisis to be classified as systemic. This condition is supplemented with three other criteria, namely that the share of nonperforming loans exceed 20 percent, bank closures make up at least 20 percent of banking assets and fiscal restructuring costs exceed 5 percent of GDP. Our crisis variable is one when a banking crisis started in the five-year period before and is zero otherwise.
Method
As we are interested in the within country relationship between finance and income inequality, we use a dynamic panel model instead of OLS cross-section regressions in our main analysis. As pointed out by Beck et al. (2007) , a dynamic panel model has several advantages compared to cross-country regressions as the latter do not fully control for unobserved country-specific effects and do not exploit the time-series dimension of the data. The model estimated is:
Where Ineq is income inequality, FD is financial development, FL is financial liberalization, BC denotes the occurrence of a banking crisis and X is a vector of control variables, while u denotes the error term. Time lags are used to avoid endogeneity issues (but this may not be 15 sufficient and therefore we consider alternative approaches below). For FD and FL we take values at the end of the five-year period preceding the period covered by the Gini coefficient (which is a five-year average), while the banking crisis dummy is one when a banking crisis started in any of the five years preceding the five-year period used for calculating the Gini coefficient. We have used a very long list of control variables based on previous studies (shown in Table A2 in the Appendix; Tables A3 and A4 provides summary statistics and a correlation matrix). 18 As pointed out in the Introduction, we focus on two interactions that, according to insights from the literature, may condition the impact of finance on income inequality. First, we examine whether the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality depends on the level of financial sector development. Second, we examine whether the impact of financial liberalization and/or financial development on income inequality is conditioned by institutional quality.
We have constructed two institutional quality variables using the ICRG database measuring the quality of political institutions and the quality of economic institutions, respectively. On a scale from zero (low quality) to six (high quality), the variable democratic Tables 2 and 3 present the results where we proceed as follows. First, we show the results when we do not include control variables. As our three finance measures may be related (e.g. more financial development may lead to more banking crises and a low level of financial development may be an incentive for countries to introduce financial liberalization), we first show simple bivariate regressions before including all our finance measures. In the next step we add the interactions outlined above. To interpret the interaction effects, we use graphs as suggested by Brambor et al. (2006) . 19 Finally, we add control variables in Table 2 that turn out to be significant (in Table 3 we include the same controls). In Table 2 the measure for financial liberalization based on Abiad et al. (2008) is used, while in Table 3 financial liberalization is proxied by the index based on several components of the Fraser Institute's economic freedom index, which captures more dimensions of the financial system than the index of Abiad et al. (2010) .
Main results
[ Tables 2 and 3 here]
In the first three columns of Tables 2 and 3 the financial sector variables are included separately, while column (4) shows the results when all finance measures are included. In the regressions in these columns we do not include interaction terms and control variables. The results suggest that financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises increase income inequality, also when they are included simultaneously.
Next we turn to the interaction of financial liberalization and financial development to examine whether financial development conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality, as suggested by Bumann and Lensink (2016) . The line in Figure 4 shows the marginal impact of financial liberalization on income inequality for different levels of financial development. The whiskers show the confidence band and the grey bars show the distribution of the observations. The graphs are based on the estimates reported in column (5) of both tables. The graphs in Figure 4 suggest that the impact of financial liberalization is conditioned by the level of financial development: the positive impact of financial liberalization on the Gini coefficient is higher when financial development is higher. This conclusion holds for both measures of financial liberalization. 20 Adding time fixed effects does not change our conclusion (not shown; results available on request). So these results do not support the prediction of Bumann and Lensink (2015) that financial liberalization will decrease income inequality at high levels of financial development.
[ Figure 4 here]
In the next step we consider institutional quality. We first add our proxies for the quality of political and economic institutions to the model shown in column (4). Including these variables may shed some light on the relevance of a potential criticism of our results, namely that inequality and financial development are both driven by institutional factors.
For instance, according to Claessens and Perotti (2007, p. 749) , "economic inequality and (financial) underdevelopment are jointly determined by institutional factors which cause unequal access to political and contractual rights." If true, adding proxies for institutional quality should affect our results. It turns out that democratic accountability is significant in contrast to our proxy for the quality of economic institutions which is therefore not shown in column (6) of Tables 2 and 3 . Our results suggest that better political institutions reduce income inequality. Importantly, adding the quality of institutions does not change our previous finding that finance increases income inequality. Figure 5 shows the marginal effects of financial liberalization on income inequality for different levels of democratic accountability. The graphs are based on the regressions shown in column (7) of Tables 2 and 3. They suggest that the positive impact of financial liberalization on the Gini coefficient is higher in countries with a higher quality of political institutions. In fact, at low levels of democratic accountability financial liberalization does not significantly affect income inequality. In these regressions we do not include the interaction between financial liberalization and financial development as financial development has been shown to be dependent on institutional quality (see e.g. Law and
Azman-Saini, 2012). Figure 6 presents the marginal effects of financial development on income inequality for different levels of democratic accountability. The graphs are based on the regressions shown in column (8) of Tables 2 and 3 . They do not provide strong evidence that the impact of financial development on income inequality is conditioned by the quality of political institutions, in contrast to the prediction of Rajan and Zingales (2003) that under high-quality institutions financial development will reduce inequality.
The interactions of our finance variables and our proxy for the quality of economic institutions do not suggest that the impact of finance on income inequality is conditioned by the quality of economic institutions. For instance, Figure [ Figures 5 and 6 here]
The next column in both tables shows the results when we add economic globalization to the model shown in column (7) of Tables 2 and 3 . As said, we consider a long list of potential controls, but most of them are not significant. In line with findings of Sturm and de Haan (2015) , globalization turns out to be significant in Tables 2 and 3 (column 9). Adding controls does not change our conclusions as shown by the marginal plot graphs (available on request).
Sensitivity analysis
In this section we present the outcomes of several sensitivity tests that have two purposes.
First, as our results deviate from those of several previous studies, we examine to what extent our findings change when different empirical set-ups are used. Second, we further analyze whether our results are robust for endogeneity, which is a key issue in this type of 19 analysis.
Random effects models
So far, our results are based on panel fixed effects models. In this section we present the outcomes of random effects models following Clarke et al. (2006) who use random effects arguing that using fixed effects takes away much (cross-country) variation. Since the Hausman tests often do not clearly indicate that fixed effects need to be used, it makes sense to also estimate random effects models. This has an additional advantage, namely that we can follow several previous papers (Clarke et al., 2006; Kappel, 2010; Kanieda et al. 2014 and Law et al., 2014) and use legal origin dummies as instruments for financial development. According to La Porta et al. (1997 , the introduction of common or civil law into a country via conquest or colonization not only affected the legal rules but also institutions. For instance, the protection of property rights in common law countries, which impacts the development of financial markets, is stronger than that in civil law countries, notably in countries with French civil law. Therefore, legal origin dummies are frequently used as instrumental variables (cf. Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005) . Table 4 shows the outcomes. Columns (1)- (4) present the results when we use the measure for financial liberalization based on the data of Abiad et al., while columns (5)- (8) contain the results for the financial liberalization measure based on components of the economic freedom index.
Columns (1) and (5) show the results when we estimate the model shown in column (5) of Tables 2 and 3 which includes our finance variables and the interaction between financial liberalization and financial development allowing for random effects. It turns out that the results are very similar. Next, in columns (3) and (7) we include democratic accountability in the model containing our three finance measures together with its interaction with financial liberalization (cf. column (7) in Tables 2 and 3 ). Like before, the results suggest that finance increases inequality, while institutional quality decreases inequality. In countries where democratic accountability is high, the effect of financial liberalization turns significantly positive. Hence, moving to a random effects framework does not lead to different results.
Finally, columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) show the IV results. In columns (2) and (4) Tables 2 and 3 ). In columns (4) and (8) the interaction between the quality of political institutions and financial liberalization is included. (This corresponds to the specification in column (7) of Tables 2   and 3 ). The outcomes suggest that instrumenting financial development by legal origin does not lead to different outcomes (see also Figure A2 in the Appendix).
[ Table 4 here]
Cross-country regressions
Next, we present cross-country regressions results in Table 5 . Even though we feel that panel models are most appropriate for our purpose, we want to check whether our results are different when we focus on cross-country differences in income inequality rather than within-country income inequality. We only show the outcomes for the financial liberalization measure based on the data of Abiad et al., as this is the variable used in previous studies. We use the specification with the three finance variables, democratic accountability and the interaction between financial liberalization and democratic accountability for different cross-sections (1991-95, 1991-2000, 1991-2005, 1996-2000, 1996-2005, and 1996-2010) . This corresponds to column (7) in Tables 2 and 3 . The final three columns show the outcomes in case we again instrument financial development by legal origin using the latter time periods. The results for banking crises and financial liberalization are broadly in line with our findings based on panel estimates, but we now find some evidence that financial development reduces income inequality (although the estimated coefficient is not significant in most regressions). This suggests that our focus on within-country income inequality explains to some extent the difference between the results of our study for the impact of financial development on income inequality and those of previous studies focusing on cross-country income inequality. Another difference between the panel and the cross-country regressions is that the coefficient of the quality of political institutions is never significant in the latter.
[ Table 5 here] 21
OECD countries
In this section we report the results when we estimate some models for OECD countries only. Table 6 shows fixed effects panel regressions for the specifications shown in columns (4), (5) and (7) of Tables 2 and 3. Our prior is that the interactions will not be significant, as the countries in this subsample are much more homogeneous when it comes to financial development and institutional quality than is the case in our full sample. This indeed turns out to be the case. Still, our main result that finance increases income inequality is also confirmed for OECD countries, also when we use our alternative measure for financial liberalization (last three columns of Table 6 ).
[ Table 6 here]
Conclusion
Our results suggest that financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises increase income inequality. In addition, the impact of financial liberalization on inequality seems to be conditioned by the level of financial development and the quality of political institutions. Our findings are in contrast to several previous studies that examined the relationship between financial development and income inequality.
As explained in section 2, theory is not clear whether financial development will increase or decrease income inequality. Our results suggest that financial development increases inequality, which is in line with the model of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) . It is important, however, to stress that our results do not imply that financial development and financial liberalization are necessarily bad for the poor. There is a large literature
showing that finance plays a positive role in promoting economic development (at least up to a point), 21 which will benefit the poor. An interesting avenue for future research is to 21 Some recent studies suggest that this relationship may be non-linear. For instance, Arcand et al. (2012) report that at intermediate levels of financial depth, there is a positive relationship between the size of the financial system and economic growth, but at high levels of financial depth, more finance is associated with less growth. In fact, the marginal effect of financial depth on output growth becomes negative when credit to the private sector reaches 80-100 per cent of GDP. Likewise, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) report that financial development has a non-linear impact on aggregate productivity growth. Based on a sample of developed and emerging economies, they show that the level of financial development is good only up to a point, after which it becomes a drag on 22 model the effects of financial development and financial liberalization on income inequality and economic growth simultaneously.
Our finding that financial development on income inequality is not conditioned by democratic accountability is in contrast to the prediction of Rajan and Zingales (2003) (1), (3), (5) and (7). In the "+IV" columns dom. credit is instrumented using legal origin dummies and bootstrapped standard errors are shown.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abiad et al. index (corrected) Avg.of EFW-areas 3D, 4C, 4D and 5A .6
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